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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY
VIOLENCE IN AN "ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY":
THE BEAUMONT RACE RIOT, 1943
by James A. Burran
War forcibly alters a nation. The economic, political, and social structure
is tested, perhaps shaken or crumbled. Not the least of the alterations produced
by war has been a redirection in the role of black Americans. World War II
proved no exception as the years of conflict fostered increased hope and frustra-
tion for blacks. Having been disproportionately represented on the unemploy-
ment rolls of the 19308, they welcomed the defense buildup which began in 1940.
But as they would soon discover, the fruits belonged to whites only. As blacks
carne to realize this they proved more reticent to engage wholly in the war effort,
demonstrating a renewed awareness of the hypocrisy of American democratic
principles through such activities as the March on Washington Movement. While
controversy exists over whether the position of blacks in the war was conserva-
tive in nature or a time of genuine protest, the racial violence of 1943 suggests
that changes were occurring. The race riots of that year, moreover, seriously
threatened an American war effort for the first time and thus assumed new
dimensions. Of the rash of racial conflagrations during the war years that in
Beaumont, Texas was perhaps the last in which blacks and their property proved
exclusively to be the victims.1
Beaumont lay on the banks of the Neches River just east of Houston. In
1940 Beaumont contained 59,000 citizens, with black residents forming 32 per-
cent of the population. By mid-I943 the city had grown to an estimated 80,000
persons, or an increase of 21,000 inhabitants in three years, with blacks still
representing fully one-third of the citizenry.2
The city and its surrounding area was an "arsenal of democracy," teeming
with war production. Pennsylvania Shipyards, Inc., a ship repair and construc-
tion business that handled mostly cargo ships and built the famous Liberty Ships,
constituted by far the largest single war industry in Beaumont. The shipyard
employed 8,500 men at its location on the Neches River and held yearly govern-
ment contracts in excess of $100 million dollars. Oil refineries of major petro-
leum companies, concerns which produced bombs and other wartime goods, and
several other shipyards dotted the area. In Orange, Texas, situated twenty-six
miles east of Beaumont on the Louisiana border, lay the Consolidated Steel
Shipyards, erected as part of the Maritime Commission's expansion project in
1940. It ultimately became larger than any other neighboring shipyard, with
yearly government contracts totaling $240 million dollars. 3
With such a profusion of war industries employing black and white laborers,
it should have been no surprise that by 1942 Beaumont began to seethe with
racial discord. The maze of businesses, both large and small, caused overcrowd-
ing. Because Beaumont lacked adequate housing, many workers had to be trans-
ported to and from the city from outlying areas every day. In one instance auto
transport trucks were converted into makeshift buses to help ease the problem. 4
Economic restriction was a second general cause of racial animosity in
Beaumont during the war years. Wages reached an all time high, jobs were
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existed. This boom condition was not confined to Beaumont, of course, but pre-
vailed in every war center, But with restrictions on many domestic items the
public was unable to use its economic affluence in accordance with its wishes.
Since consumer items were unavailable, most people were forced to be content
with possession of a fat bank account and a prewar car with threadbare tires
and an empty gasoline tank. Thus many became dissatisfied with the norms of a
planned economy and tempers grew short as the weight of wartime society began
to bc felt.
City transportation further aggravated problems. The Beaumont City Lines
bus service had been quite adequate in 1940, but with the rapid growth of the
city the system became overcrowded. And, since no cars or buses were being
produced for domestic use, the company could not expand to meet new needs.
Overcrowding caused a severe strain between blacks and whites because when
the buses were packed blacks often stood in the aisles ahead of the dividing
signs for the segregated sections required by city ordinance. Intolerant whites
demanded that the law be obeyed to the letter, especially to avoid contact be-
tween black men and white women. This situation spawned the first burst of
racial violence in the city, and served as a predecessor to more widespread
discord.
On June 30, 1942, tbree altercations between blacks and whites occurred
aboard city buses within the black district. Each of these incidents involved the
presence of black passengers in the white sections of the buses because of over-
flow from Jim Crow sections. Further racial difficulties aboard buses occurred
on July 2, provoking the ire of whites and undoubtedly stimulating diseord. 5
On July 27 another confrontation developed aboard a city bus, this one
between the driver and a black passenger, Charles J. RecD. The black man, a
military policeman at home on leave, boarded the vehicle and took a seat next
to the Jim Crow sign where his knees protruded into the white section. The
driver ordered Reco to move but was roundly cursed. Takep. aback, the driver
sent word for the police to arrest Reco, and fOUf officers arrived on the scene
and forcibly removed him to a waiting squad car. During this incident Reco
continued to resist the policemen, and at one point reached for Officer Billy
Brown's nightstick and revolver. At this Brown pulled his gun and, with Reeo's
hand on the barrel, shot the black man three times. Officer Ben B. White then
shot Reeo an additional time, and Officer Clyde Brown, despite a fractured hand
suffered while removing Reeo from the bus, managed to club the victim with
his nightstick.6
Police transported Reco to the police station where he was charged with
using abusive language. Subsequently, Reeo recovered from his wounds at Fort
Crockett near Galveston, but not before he brought the U. S. Government into
the incident. Reee's superiors, astounded at what had occurred, duly related the
details to the War Department, which in tum informed the Attorney General,
Francis Biddle. Without hesitation Biddle launched a scorching verbal barrage
against the Beaumont Police Department and Ross Dickey, Chief of Police since
mid-1942 and a former state patrolman. The federal district attorney in Beau-
mont began an investigation, and a grand jury convened to hear evidence on the
incident.
But as in many other cases, the investigation came to nothing. The grand
jury on August 19 exonerated the policemen of all responsibility in the incident,
and the Attorney General's office quietly dropped the Reco case since there
seemed to be "no prospect of conviction." Once again discrimination had
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emerged victorious while those who saw the actual course of race relations in
Beaumont could only grimace helplessly. 'r
The remainder of 1942 and the early months of 1943 appeared relatively
calm in Beaumont, as well as in the state and nation, as the country worked
feverishly for victory. But while building itself into an arsenal of war, the nation
concurrently produced a lethal atmosphere of strain and suspicion as society
grew to fit the needs of the era. This tension developed in Beaumont to as high
a degree as anywhere, while traditional discrimination and racial inequality
during the winter of 1942 and spring of 1943 made the situation even more
ominous.s
As the summer of 1943 approached, the nation had reached full production,
and economic conditions were good when compared with those of the previous
decade. Howeverl wartime tensions, suspicions, and the instability of society
culminated in a highly combustible racial atmosphere which finally erupted in a
full summer of racial bedlam, resulting in many deaths, untold injuries, and
inestimable financial Josses.
The first race riot of the long summer of 1943 had occurred in Mobile,
Alabama, Pressure from the Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) to
upgrade jobs for blacks forced the Alabama Drydock and Shipbuilding Company
to place several blacks alongside whites on the shipways in skilled positions.
Violence resulted on May 25, but fortunately no deaths occurred. The shipyard
then sent home aU 71000 black employees until the situation was rectified, keep-
ing the 22,000 white workers on the job, The result was segregation as the
FEPC permitted the shipyard to allow blacks exclusively to man four shipways
while whites manned the rest. This proved a poor substitute for the original
principles of the FEPC and understandably brought denunciation from the black
population.9
On June 3 racial violence again occurredl this time in Los Angeles-the
infamous "zoot-suit" riots. Hcre white servicemen and civilians victimized Mexi-
can-Americans in an outburst of racial discord caused largely by racist sensa-
tionalism from the local press, In the several days of rioting injuries abounded
as the downtown areas swarmed with crazed rioters, As in other similar inci-
dents, most of the participants escaped punishment.10
During the turbulence at Los Angeles, Beaumont began seething with its
own racial hatred. Curtis Thomas, a young black man, beat and raped an
eightecn-year-old white telephone operator on the night of June 4, Thomas, who
had been called for induction into the army, was clearly irrational as he explained
to the victim his motive for the assault: "The army is going to get me, and if I
do :this, I'll get killed for this and I won't be going to the army." True to his
prognostication, Thomas later that night found himself in the Ilnegro ward" of
Hotel Dieu hospital near death after police shot him several times as he at~
tempted to escape from the scene, momentarily having lost the desire to die. ll
About 3:00 a.m, on the morning of June 6, a potential lynch mob formed
outside the hospital and began calling for Thomas. Fortunately, the angry crowd
-numbering about 50-lacked a leader or spokesman so that it never took
decisive actionl especially after Police Chief Dickey arrived and verbally ac-
costed them. Reminding them that Thomas, who had been spirited away to the
city jail, would undoubtedly die as a result of his wounds, Dickey persuaded the
mob to disperse. The fact that Thomas succumbed on June 8 precluded another
lynching attempt, but the racial hatred of some whites became even more indig-
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proved predominant among the white employees of Pennsylvania Shipyards, who
had formed the majority of the mob. Many of these individuals were not native
Beaumonters, but had been attracted to the city by the lure of good jobs. Root-
less, frustrated, and alienated, these citizens, as well as other whites, proved
potentially dangerous-. 12
On the afternoon of June 15, 1943, the Beaumont police received a tele-
phone call from a woman13 stating that she had been raped by a black man.
This sent officers scurrying to the scene to determine the identity of the alleged
rapist and the condition of the victim. Roadblocks were thrown up in the vicinity
and groups of policemen, sheriffs department officers, state troopers and inter-
ested citizens began to scour the area in search of the black man. Other officers
searched the woman'!'. house for telltale fingerprints, but none were found. The
authorities possessed only the woman's vague description of her assailant: he
was of average build and features.
As word of this incident spread throughout the city, many Beaumonters
must have fumed at the thought of the attack but apparently refused to be driven
to violence by rumors. In the Penn::;.ylvania Shipyards, however, a different mood
existed. Employees exchanged information about the incident, and rumOr begat
rumor as night shift employees began to enter the yards for work and tell of
what had happened in more tainted detaiL Quickly the shipyard employees
became excited and restive as they recounted the Curtis Thomas affair and now
the violation of a young mother.
About nine o'clock on the night of June 15 over 2,000 shipyard workers
dropped their tools and marched out of the yards. The walkout appeared to be
spontaneous, with almost all white workers taking part. The mob crossed the
bridge separating the shipyard island from the rest of the city and continued
downtown toward the city hall, police station, and Jefferson County Courthouse,
all situated only a few blocks apart. Along the way the crowd swelled to perhaps
3,000 as interested bystanders joined.14
When the mob reached the police station it had driven itself into a wild
frenzy. A lack of organization and leadership fortunately prevailed, and they
simply milled about the city jail section of the police station, demanding that
the rapist be handed over to be lynched. Chief of Police Dickey, fearing mass
destruction, brought the alleged victim to the scene in an effort to pacify the
throng, but her pleas went unheeded.
As the mob grew increasingly hostile, some continued to the courthouse,
where they demanded that Sheriff W. W. Richardson escort them through the
county jail to make sure the alleged rapist was not present. Richardson con-
sented, but why the group wanted a tour is unclear, since no one could have
recognized the criminal had he been there. Satisfied that the black was not
present, the throng moved back to the police station to rejoin the main body
which soon burst out of control. Even though leadership was lacking it spon-
taneously reacted to the situation in a fashion characteristic of other race riots. 15
About midnight on June 15 the mob, which may have numbered over 4,000,
began rioting through the nearby black districts of the city. This rioting continued
widespread and uncontrolled until about daylight on the morning of June 16.
During these hours confusion reigned as the rioters swarmed over most of the
downtown area, causing death and destruction.
As in most other race riots, the violence in Beaumont began and continued
spontaneously_ No ringleaders guided the crowd. Because it was disorganized,
the riot proved less destructive than it might have been. The mob, numbering
l
l, '














probably between 3,000 and 4,000 when it assembled at the police station, cer-
tainly could have become larger once the actual rioting began and as interested
citizens swelled the ranks. With a mob of perhaps 5,000 the chances for a wide-
spread holocaust appeared strong, but the lack of leadership contributed to the
relative brevity of the riot and limited destruction by the rioters.
The lack of leadership and disorganization also affected the overall pattern
of turbulence in Beaumont. The black districts of the city encompassed much
of downtown, but there were two general areas where blacks were concentrated.
One lay in the downtown district, and the other in the northern sector of the
city. Since the two sections lay some distance apart, an "organized" mob proba-
bly would have attacked one at a time, or by splitting the crowd, might have
attacked both districts simultaneously. But for lack of leadership the attack lost
its full force, The mob, once it resolved to riot, broke up into small bands and
roamed the downtown area all night. Each band, usually consisting of from five
to t\Venty-five members, carried out its own plan of destruction. Very rarely did
these bodies join into a large throng to effect particularly devastating ruination.
Before leaving the police station around midnight, the mob took as its first
victim an unfortunate black man who attempted to drive past the scene in his
car. Some of the throng pulled him from the vehicle, pummeled him, then over-
turned his auto and set it ablaze. The aggregation then broke up and either ram-
paged through the downtown area or journeyed to the northern sector of the
city, largely a black residential district.
Downtown, the mob generally spent its time firing buildings and autos,
while beating every black encountered. Some buildings burned to the ground,
among them the city's three black funeral homes, a jewelry store which undoubt-
edly was looted, and a pharmacy. Against this onslaught most black inhabitants
retreated to the inner areas of the black district where the rioters dared not
venture.16
In the city's northern black district, as downtown, pandemonium prevailed.
The rioters, in small groups, roamed the area in total darkness, leading to several
cases "'of mistaken identity-at least four whites were shot. Property destruction
here became more widespread than downtown. Several autos met a fiery demise,
as did many buildings, leading the fire chief to later opine that the fire depart-
ment spent most of the period from midnight to daybreak battling blazes in the
northern district. Sixteen major fires were reported in the area, together with
numerous smaller blazes. Looting occurred as well, and autos could be seen
speeding through the city filled with assorted stolen goodS. 17
One black man had a clear view of the destruction as looters swept through
the Dew Drop Inn on Gladys Street. P. G. Thomas, the restaurant owner, re-
mained inside when rioters arrived shortly after midnight to break down the
front door and sack the building. From a service window, Thomas observed in
horror as they systematically destroyed the interior of the structure. Nearby,
Perrodin's Radio and Sound Service, Bendy's Cafe, and the Canton Cafe received
similar treatment.18
Personal violence ran rampant along with the destruction and looting. A
black shot a white man as he walked home from work. A white youth, undoubt-
edly taking part in the rioting, suffered a bullet in the back as he stood alongside
an auto. Many blacks had their teeth knocked out and jaws smashed by a group
of hammer-wielding whites. Their fate resembled that of countless other blacks
whom rioters encountered.
One of the most concentrated areas of personal violence occurred at the
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bus depot on Park Street. Fifty-two black draftees who had been in Houston for
their physical examinations waited in the station for a bus to their homes in Port
Arthur. About midnight a mob of three to four hundred rioters appeared: "Here
they are, a whole bunch of them. Let's get them." As a result most of the black
inductees received injuries, many of which proved serious. Irvin Collins received
numerous blows from iron pipes and proved a target for armed rioters. He finally
crawled under a nearby house where he remained until the next day. Roy Ford,
another draftee, climbed on top of the depot to escape serious injury and wit-
nissed a panoramic view of the holocaust. Alex Mouton received several blows
while still inside the building. He ran out, only to be clubbed mercilessly by
whites. He suffered a serious heart injury in the affray, and subsequently died
on October 4.19
Other serious injuries occurred throughout the town. John Johnson, a black
employee of the American Ice Company, had just entered his car after working
past midnight when a group of whites shotgunned him in the abdomen. He died
on the operating table.
In the fringes of the riot area Ellis C. Brown, a white carpenter, was found
dead with a crushed skull. There were no witnesses, but police speculated that
a group of blacks was responsible. This is not to suggest that blacks acted as
aggressively as whites during the riot. Most blacks remained on the defensive,
but a few undoubtedly used the situation to vent their frustrations on whites
through retaliatory action.20
Blacks suffered many casualties and witnessed much destruction during the
riot. Rioters reportedly broke into over two hundred homes, many of which they
fired. Probably at least three or four hundred blacks received injuries, and some
were hospitalized. Hospital records do not accurately reflect the number of in-
juries, however, since most blacks felt apprehensive about entering the hospital
for fear of further beating or arrest for rioting. Besides those injured, about 2,500
blacks fled the city by foot or auto, some never to return. Many of those who
left included black shipyard workers. 21
During the period of death and destruction, the law enforcement contingents
engaged in chaotic activity. At the outset of the violence Chief Dickey called the
entire rcgular force to duty and mObilized the l50-member police auxiliary. The
sheriff activated his department, and city officials called up four companies of
the 18th Battalion of the Texas State Guard, which consisted of Beaumont resi-
dents commanded by Major Fred C. Stone, a local architect.
Unfortunately, during the height of rioting, these relatively scant forces had
to battle the holocaust alone since most units called in later from outlying areas
did not arrive until the violence had subsided. Accordingly, Dickey placed most
of the force on hand in the riot-tom sections of the city where it attempted to
curb the violence. This effort proved fruitless, although peace officers endeavored
to incarcerate suspected rioters. Most of those who found themselves confronted
by suspicious officials, however, either argued their way out of arrest or silently
disappeared into the darkness. 22
This accounted for the meager tally of arrests made during the riot-only
206. 'What made the figure even more surprising, however, was that the total
enforcement contingent could not have numbered less than 400. Part of the
explanation lay in the lack of detention facilities. By summarily arresting indi-
viduals who appeared to be rioters, lawmen quickly filled to capacity the city
and county jails. A makeshift remedy was finally found, and officers herded
subsequent prisoners into a large building on the county fairgrounds. Other rea-
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sons for the relatively small number arrested included the laxity of enforcement
and general confusion. Despite these conditions, officers did confiscate 156 pis-
tols, 56 shotguns, 44 rifles, 86 knives, 43 clubs, 11 brass knuckles, a huge
quantity of ammunition, and other "miscellaneous weapons including hammers,
pipes, sashweights, etc. "23
Most of the arrests and confiscations took place without the help of the
four companies of the Texas State Guard, since this body of erstwhile soldiers
spent the bulk of the night organizing for action. After moving from the court-
house, where its weapons lay, to Beaumont High School, where it stood for hours,
the battalion moved a third time to the lawn of City Hall. Pup tents and barbed
wire sprang up, and a Salvation Army canteen appeared to feed the warriors.
Most of the guardsmen, including the 18th Battalion and the other forces
that later arrived, spent their time patrolling the streets for would-be rioters. The
guardsmen did capture and jail some persons, but patrolling stricken areas of
the city remained the major responsibility of the men during their activation
which lasted until June 20. 24
At the first sign of violence on June 15 the city administration had con-
tacted the state government in Austin. Unfortunately, Governor Coke R. Steven-
son was on his way to Washington, and the lieutenant governor, John Lee Smith,
was in the Midwest. In place of the top executives stood A. M. Aikin, Jr., the
president pro tempore of the Texas Senate. Aikin had occupied the acting gov-
ernor's office only one day when the riot erupted.
Aikin understandably hesitated to take action, but shortly after the riot
began authorized the deployment of an additional 1,600 Texas State Guardsmen
from nearby cities, as well as Department of Public Safety men and other police
units. None of these contingents arrived during the actual rioting, but they helped
control an additional outbreak about midday of the 16th.
The major violence had subsided about daybreak, with the riot simply
exhausting itself rather than being brought under control by outside forces. But
at the courthouse about 200 men, mostly shipyard workers, gathered about noon
on the 16th to demand of Sheriff Richardson the whereabouts of the alleged
rapist whose actions had precipitated the violence. Richardson, however, proved
to be at wit's end. 2lj. He appeared on the front steps of the building with a sub-
machine gun crooked under one arm, and notified the throng that he was "damn
tired of all this." The sheriff then ordered the crowd to disperse and "go back
to building ships like you should be doing." The unruly mob began jeering at
Richardson, who then shouted that he would take them "all on one at a time.
And let me tell you, I'm going to keep law and order in this county."26
Rebuffed, the mob dispersed. In a few minutes, however, most of these
men congregated again and headed for the downtown black district, apparently
bent on causing trouble. They subsequently met a barricade manned by Texas
Rangers, who told them to disband. When they did not, the officers sprayed the
throng with tear gas, an action which effectively ended the rioting in Beaumont.
The violence had claimed three lives; several hundred persons received injuries;
untold property was destroyed.27
At 5:55 p.m. on June 16 Acting Governor Aikin declared martial law in
Beaumont. Communications had continued between the city administration and
Aikin since the affray erupted, and by the afternoon of June 16 they had deter-
mined that in order to avoid further violence in a critical war production center
quick enactment of martial law would be necessary. Aikin accordingly issued
the long overdue order, placing control of the city in the hands of Lieutenant
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Colonel Sidney C. Mason of the Adjutant General's Department. The acting
governor assured Mason that martial law would be maintained in the city as
long as it was deemed necessary. 28
By nightfall on the 16th about 2,400 law enforcement personnel occupied
the city, consisting of 1,800 Texas State Guardsmen, as well as city policemen,
the police auxiliary, Texas Rangers, state policemen, and sheriff's department
officials. The city looked like a military camp. The all important defense plants
lay paralyzed, with work at Pennsylvania Shipyards stopping on the night of the
riot and not reaching full production again for a week. Agitation continued in
the yards, and possibly violence could have recurred had it not been for the
presence of the troopS.29
The riot temporarily affected the daily routine of wartime life. On June 16
city officials cancelled "Juneteenth" (a holiday for blacks in Texas which com-
memorated their emancipation on June 19) since they feared it might spark
another conflagration. Chief of Police Dickey ordered all city buses off the
streets, and also diverted Greyhound buses around the city. Military authorities
placed the city off limits to service personnel, possibly to avoid racial violence
such as occurred in Los Angeles only a fortnight before.
Many restaurants, hotels, laundries, and other businesses remained closed
for a week; mail service was also severely curtailed since most Beaumont mail
carriers were black. On the 16th city officials closed all liquor stores in the area,
and guardsmen patrolled these places to insure against looting. Additionally, all
city swimming pools, parks, and downtown stores closed to keep people off the
streets. In short, most functions of the city either closed or operated on a severely
restricted basis so that no large bodies of people could amass until the highly
combustible -atmosphere cleared somewhat. 30
The rioting affected not only Beaumont but also surrounding towns. The
Consolidated Steel Shipyards in Orange temporarily dismissed all black em-
ployees beginning on June 16 but retained the whites to avert further violence.
The City of Orange placed its state guard contingent on alert. The large rubber
plant in Port Neches sent its 1,200 black employees home. Similar precautions
were taken in Port Arthur, Baytown, and other nearby cities. In response to
rumors that floated in from Beaumont, the city administration in nearby Houston
placed a full page statement in the Houston Post on June 18 which implored
citizens to "stop circulating rumors which create tenseness and interfere with war
production and attend to your own business." Obviously the tensions, resent-
ments, and general instability of wartime society existed not only in Beaumont
but also throughout southeast Texas as in much of wartime America.31
Local authorities naturally concerned themselves with the reasons for the
riot. The general assertion that sabotage inspired Beaumont's racial turbulence
became the standard argument: the city, a critical production area, had spawned
a riot which pitted American against American and crippled vital war prOduc-
tion, thereby stirring fcars that Axis influence had incited the recent violence.
The editor of the local Beaumont Enterpri~ concluded:
By committing lawless acts and halting work in vital war indus-
tries, they [the rioters] played right into the hands of the enemy. Some
of the men who said they had quit work "to protect their families"
may have been the unconscious tools of enemy agents.
There is a strong suspicion that enemy agents are trying to create
racial friction here, that they have been engaged in this kind of subw














This view lacked credence, however, as proved in an inquiry by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. FBI agcnts arrived on the 16th and remained in the
city for the next several days. They naturally pursued the possibility of enemy
influence, and to that end collected numerous depositions and considerable evi-
dence. While the agents made no public report of their findings, the press dis-
closed that, according to "unquotablc" but presumably reliable sources, the FBI
found no sign of enemy activity in relation to the riot. The blame for the out-
break was thus placed upon the local citizenry, with emphasis on the shipyard
workers.33
While the FBI investigation continued, an inquiry by the state simultane-
ously occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Royal G. Phillips of the Department of
Public Safety arrived in the city on June 17 and began hearing the 206 prisoners
who had been incarcerated in connection with the riot. This military tribunal
commenced its investigation on June 17 and worked almost without pause until
all had been heard on the afternoon of June 20. Of the total, officials held only
twenty-nine men for further action, the remainder being released largely for lack
of evidence. Of those retained, the majority were charged with such offenses as
loitering, drunkenness, and carrying firearms. These crimes carried a penalty of
$25 plus court costs, so that participation in the riot, regardless of what had
happened to the black community, essentially carried a $30.20 fine.
On June 22 Pbillips officially ended his inquiry and pronounced the case
closed as far as the State of Texas was concerned. Of several thousand rioters,
only 206 had been brought to court, and only a fraction of that number faced
conviction. None received serious penalties. No effort was made to discover the
murderers of Ellis C. Brown, John Johnson, or Alex Mouton. Moreover, the fact
that no arson charges were levied seemed consistent with the fashion in which
the administration of nation, state, and city handled the entire affair. That the
guilty parties remained undiscovered seemed to produce no remorse from those
charged with investigating the affray since ending the riot was more important
at the time than seeking justice.J4
Ironically, a day after the rioting ended, the results were released of a
physical examination performed on the woman who reported being raped by a
black man on June 15. The examination, directed by Dr. Barker D. Chunn, a
reputable Beaumont physician, disclosed that the woman had in fact not been
raped. Moreover, Chunn determined that sexual relations had been absent during
the twenty-four hour period surrounding the alleged assault. 35
During the period of speculation and investigation Beaumont remained
quiet. June 19 passed serenely, although officials had been apprehensive about
the maintenance of peace in the city because of the cancelled Juneteenth cele-
bration and a city recall election which resulted in the removal of the current
city administration-and eventually Jed to the resignation of Chief of Police
Ross Dickey whom the voters blamed for the riot. The lack of renewed violence
on that day proved to be an indicant that the state officials had been watChing
for, and on June 20 Acting Governor Aikin lifted martial law. The troops in the
city were deactivated, and control of the stricken area returned to city officials. 36
If the riot had been a traumatic experience for the city, its effects on Beau-
mont proved to be negligible. By the end of July the war production of the area
had returned to normal, still with segregation and discrimination against blacks.
Pennsylvania Shipyards undoubtedly listed fewer blacks on its employment rolls,
but otherwise conditions remained the same. Racial agitation was minimized
throughout the city, but this was due to fear of another riot rather than improved
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relations betwee-n blacks and whites. Subsequent police chiefs and city admin-
istrations ignored the race problem as had been done in the past, and over the
years the gradual improvement of conditions for blacks has occurred in spite
of the white majority.
While Beaumont smouldered in the aftermath of violence, a much larger
affray occurred as a continuation of the summer of domestic rioting. The Detroit
race riot began on June 20, caused largely by rumor and long-standing social
and economic ill will between whites and blacks. Several days of rioting wit-
nessed not only white aggression but black retaliation, in large part against white-
owned property, a trend that foreshadowed a new pattern of racial rioting that
would unfold in the 19608. The violence resulted in millions of dollars worth of
destruction, thousands of injuries, and deaths of thirty-four persons, most 01
whom were black. 3'1
The final chapter in the long summer of 1943 was written in Harlem on
August 1-2. Trouble had simmered there for years, since the riot of 1935. Blacks,
who felt alienated in what seemed to be a white man's world, vented their frustra-
tions upon white-owned property in the ghetto for two days following an alterca-
tion that involved a black woman and a white policeman. This pattern clearly
served as a precursor for future domestic racial violence. Fiorello LaGuardia,
New York's popular mayor, skillfully deployed officials-many of whom were
black-throughout the area to stop the violence while he remained on the scene
to direct affairs. He successfully curtailed what could have become a much larger
affray. Nonetheless, 5 persons died, injuries occurred to at least 300 others, and
rioters destroyed at least $5 million dollars in property.38
Of the five race riots in 1943, the incident in Beaumont provided a clear
example of white intolerance toward gradual black advancement. While subse-
quent riots showed blacks becoming mare militant and whites more defensive,
the affray in Beaumont retained the characteristics of white aggression sparked
by conservative reaction. The rumor of interracial rape, a familiar southern
theme, precipitated the violence. Lower class whites, seeking to maintain social
distinctions between themselves and blacks, spontaneously began to riot, and the
black community proved the obvious target. Generally helpless victim.;; of white
prejudice, only a few blacks were militant enough to offer resistance. The en-
forcement bodies were ineffective, perhaps intentionally so, and the violence ran
its full course with no interruption. Taken together, these characteristics marked
the Beaumont riot as perhaps the last in which whites mercilessly murdered and
pillaged without encountering substantial black retaliation.
Seen in this light, the Beaumont riot illustrated the unrest and impending
change in race relations. Subsequent violence showed a redirection in the life
of black Americans, further underscored by jUdicial decisions, presidential leadw
ership for civil rights, new scientific views on race, and the emergence of the
Third World. The Beaumont riot was one of the last setbacks to the racial
upheaval of later years, yet another forlorn attempt to stave off the twentieth
century in the South.
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